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Abstract 
 
Protected areas are employed world-wide as a means of conserving biodiversity. 
Unfortunately, restricting access to such areas imposes opportunity costs on local people who 
have traditionally relied on access to obtain resources such as fuelwood and bushmeat. We 
use contingent valuation to estimate the local benefits forgone from loss of access to a 
number of protected area types in Uganda. Methodologically, we innovate by implementing a 
“provision point” mechanism to estimate Willingness to Accept compensation (WTA) for 
loss of access to protected areas. We show that the provision point reduces mean WTA by a 
significant degree. 
 
Keywords: conservation costs, protected areas, Uganda, willingness to accept, provision 
point mechanism, WTA. 
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I. Introduction 
The establishment of protected areas (PA) such as national parks and game reserves is a 
common means of protecting biodiversity from habitat loss and hunting pressures in many 
developing countries. Protected areas enhance conservation by applying land use restrictions 
such as banning bush meat hunting and the collection of fuel-wood or timber for 
construction, and by restricting the conversion of land into agriculture. Unfortunately, 
properly enforced land use restrictions impose potentially high costs (opportunity costs) on 
local resource users (Norton-Griffiths and Southey, 1995).  
 
Communities adjacent to protected areas in Uganda normally consume, exchange, or sell 
timber and non-timber forest products (NTFP) sourced locally as part of their livelihood 
strategies. In National Parks however, legislation precludes the hunting of wild animals and 
the extraction of timber and NTFP. Poor enforcement by under-resourced management 
authorities often translates on the ground into illegal exploitation of protected areas, 
especially those immediately adjacent to communities. Indeed, the use of PA resources such 
as fuel wood has increased dramatically in Uganda in recent years (NEMA, 2001; Bush et al., 
2004; ITFC, in prep). Without access to PA resources or an alternative source of revenue, 
many rural households face increased levels of impoverishment
i
. 
 
As user pressures on protected areas increase, so do efforts to put in place more effective 
management strategies to control access, curb illegal hunting and provide communities with 
alternative means of ensuring their welfare. Unfortunately, exclusionary management 
practices tend to create tensions between local people and the authorities (Hulme and 
Murphee, 2001; Plumptre et al., 2004). If local communities wish to receive direct benefits 
from protected areas in the future, and if park authorities wish to see more stringent 
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enforcement of unpopular management rules, it seems essential to put in place a management 
regime that promotes their acceptance by local communities. Information on the costs of lost 
access is a key indicator of how much effort must be deployed in order to mitigate the effect 
of losses by local people. Such information can be used to devise mechanisms that, perhaps 
in conjunction with integrated conservation and development projects, can maintain the well-
being of local residents whilst also securing conservation objectives.   
 
This paper reports the results of a research project that aimed to measure the value of a 
complete loss of access to PAs under a (hypothetical) scenario in which local users would 
receive monetary compensation for those losses. We aim to quantify the local economic 
(opportunity) cost of conservation to communities adjacent to four protected areas in western 
and south western Uganda. The household survey (conducted from January to July 2006) 
employed contingent valuation as part of a broader questionnaire survey on household socio 
economic characteristics to estimate the market and economic values of goods currently 
taken from the local PA. Whilst market prices are useful in measuring some aspects of the 
losses deriving from land use restrictions – where losses can be substituted by market 
purchases, or where losses are in terms of foregone sales - they cannot capture the full 
economic values of access to such resources to local people (Campbell et al., 1997; Godoy et 
al., 1997; Godoy et al., 2002a; Vedeld et al., 2004; Godoy et al., 2009) .  Access to PAs can 
be viewed by local users as providing an insurance policy, given fluctuations in agricultural 
incomes both within and between years (Pattanayak and Sills, 2001).  Access also has 
cultural and social values which are not captured by market prices for products such as fuel 
wood and bushmeat. Finally, losses of non-traded (subsistence) resources also impose costs 
on local people due to absence of substitutes on local markets, or poor market access (Geist 
and Lambin, 2002; Soares et al., 2006) . In such circumstances, contingent valuation methods 
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are useful for measuring the economic value of the loss of access by local households to 
protected areas.  
 
Since stricter access restrictions would deprive locals of traditional resources over which they 
consider themselves as having de facto property rights, willingness to accept compensation 
(WTA) for those losses is a more appropriate measure of costs than Willingness to Pay. 
Despite WTA often being the more appropriate measure, WTA studies are comparatively 
rarely performed in contingent valuation since they are suspected of systematically over-
stating welfare losses (Rowe et al., 1980); Arrow et al., 1993; List and Shogren, 2002). We 
attack this vexing problem by presenting survey respondents with a payment method 
constructed from a Provision Point Mechanism (PPM) (Rondeau et al, 1999 and 2005; Poe et 
al, 2002). To our knowledge, this is the first application of a PPM in a WTA survey. The 
second objective of this paper is therefore to investigate how the PPM affects WTA value 
estimates within the context of contingent valuation. We show that the PPM significantly 
reduces the number of high value outliers and the resulting estimate of average welfare loss. 
 
In what follows, Section 2 introduces the idea of a PPM for WTA. Section 3 describes the 
survey implementation, whilst results follow in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in the final 
section. 
 
II. Measuring WTA using contingent valuation – The Provision Point Mechanism. 
The use of Contingent Valuation (CV) in developing countries is now widespread  
(Whittington, 2002; Whittington, 2004).  CV has an established history in developing 
countries for the valuation of environmental amenities arising from national parks (Kramer et 
al., 1992; Kramer et al., 1995; Willis and Garrod, 1996; Whittington, 1998; 
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International Institute for Environment and Development, 2003).  Mekonnen  (1997) applied 
WTP elicitation formats to obtain the economic value of community forestry in Ethiopia, 
whilst Lynam et al. (1994) valued trees on communal lands in Zimbabwe.  Ruitenbeek 
(1992) valued rainforests in Cameroon using a WTP scenario. In contrast, Smith et al (1998) 
use a WTA approach to analyse potential compensations payments required to induce land 
use changes among farmers in Peru with the objective of CO2 sequestration. Other studies 
address the problem of compensation payments that are required in order to induce land use 
change by local farmers for watershed protection (Kramer et al 1992; 1995).  
 
As is the case for studies from developed countries, the Willingness to Pay (WTP) format has 
indeed been largely favoured over WTA in developing country applications of CV, even 
when the objective of the research is to assess welfare losses  (Smith et al., 1998) . Harrison 
and Rustrom  (2005) discuss the historical side-stepping of WTA measures, attributing this to 
the difficulties researchers have encountered in their attempt to control scenario rejection, 
and the strong hypothetical bias that the WTA format appears to create. This bias relates to a 
tendency of respondents to overstate their true welfare loss from a change in environmental 
quality or access: in other words, WTA estimates of welfare change obtained using CV are 
thought to be “too big”, with a greater degree of bias present than for equivalent WTP 
formats (this is independent of differences between true WTP and WTA for a given 
environmental or access change: see Plott and Zeiler, 2005). WTA scenarios also typically 
produce more protest bids due to scenario rejection by respondents. As a result, there is a 
general avoidance of WTA format surveys, even when it is theoretically the more appropriate 
welfare measure to use (Knetsch, 2005).   
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In this paper, we are interested in whether a Provision Point Mechanism (PPM) can reduce 
WTA over-statement.  In its usual configuration, the PPM is a mechanism to facilitate 
voluntary contributions towards the provision of a discrete public good. We are not aware of 
any previous implementation of this mechanism in a WTA setting. It is therefore necessary to 
adapt the procedure to a WTA scenario and, accordingly, to rework the theory first laid out 
by Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), Marks and Croson (1998) and Rondeau et al. (1999) to the 
WTA context.  
 
In the WTA setting, the Provision Point (PP) is the total amount of money available (e.g. in a 
trust fund) for compensating all affected individuals in a group for the loss of access rights to 
protected areas. Individuals are asked to make a claim or bid (B) for compensation from this 
fund. If the sum of all claims exceeds the money available in the fund, no compensation 
payments are made and the status quo is maintained (no access restriction is imposed).  If the 
sum of claims is less than or equal to the PP, individual claimants receive their claim plus a 
share of the remaining portion of the total funds remaining after all claims are paid. Access 
regulations are then imposed.  
 
To be specific, define Bi, Bj as individual claims on the compensation fund, PP as the total 
amount available in the fund and N as the number of claimants. It follows that 
 


N
j
j PPBif
1
  the sum of claims exceeds the available funds, no new regulation 
or enforcement is put in place and no compensation is paid; 
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 


N
j
j PPBif
1
  the sum of claims exactly equals the amount available. 
Enforcement is put in place, compensation is paid and people receive exactly the 
individual amount of their claim; 
 


N
j
j PPBif
1
 the sum of claims is less than the funds available for compensation. 
In this case, enforcement is put in place, the compensation scheme goes ahead and people 
receive their individual compensation claim plus a share of the unclaimed funds available. 
In our application, the share to claimant i is simply equal to the proportion of i’s claim 
relative to the sum of all N claims.  
 
The PPM gives rise to strategic incentives. Assume individual i maximizes the utility derived 
from the value of having access to the protected area (Vi) and income from other sources (Ii), 
subject to the external constraint imposed by the PP. The claim Bi represents the individual’s 
revealed WTA for accepting the enforcement policy. The utility of individual i, contingent on 
the all participant’s claims is given byii 
   
 
 
 
1
1
1 1
1
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

 

 (1). 
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It is relatively straightforward to extend the game theoretic equilibrium prediction for a PPM 
in the WTP context (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Rondeau et al. 1999; (Marks and Croson, 
1998) to a WTA scenario. Our characterization of the equilibria relies only on the utility 
function of claimants being increasing in its argument, and players being rational. The 
analysis provided here is also meant to be a simple baseline illustrating the basic incentives 
for the case where there is no uncertainty about the benefits and costs of the conservation 
areas or that the program will be implemented and compensation paid. Both the value of 
conservation and the compensation payments are annual and remain constant over time. Two 
types of pure strategy Nash equilibria exist. In both cases, rationality imposes that any 
individual claim be at least as large as the individual’s loss: i iB V . Otherwise, the 
imposition of land use restrictions would necessarily result in a net loss to an individual, even 
with the compensation payment.  
 
Imposing this rationality condition and maintaining as a working assumption that the amount 
available for compensation (PP) is sufficient to compensate all losses (i.e. the benefits of 
compensation could exceed the loss of value from restricting access), one finds that one set 
of equilibria is inefficient (the program is not implemented despite the fact that the 
compensation fund is large enough to compensate all losses) and is characterized by the 
following conditions:  
    
 
1
1
;   and
N
j
j
N
j i i i
j
B PP
B PP B V



 
    
 


    (2). 
  
The first condition states that the sum of claims is greater than the amount available for 
compensation. Therefore, no compensation is paid and no policy is implemented. For this to 
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be a Nash equilibrium, it must also be the case that no individual is in a position to decrease 
his claim (in a rational manner) such that the sum of claims would become equal to or lower 
than the PP. This is the meaning of second component of Equation 2. If no rational revision 
of a single bid can be made that would result in the provision of compensation, then no one 
has an incentive to deviate from their original claim and the vector of claims is an 
equilibrium in which compensation is not paid.  
 
There is also a set of efficient equilibria in which the proposed policy is implemented and 
compensation is paid. This set is made up of any combination of claims such that  
1
N
j
j
B PP

       (3), 
together with the rationality condition that no claim is smaller than the value of the lost 
access rights. In such cases, no single individual would have an incentive to deviate from 
their claim since increasing the claim would lead to the regulation not being imposed (with 
no compensation received), while decreasing one’s claim would simply lower the 
compensation received. This set of equilibria is potentially very large. Any distribution of 
claims amongst all participants that meets condition (3) is an equilibrium. The presence of 
multiple equilibria also implies that there will also exist mixed strategy equilibria, potentially 
adding a substantial amount of noise to the data.   
 
While efficient equilibria Pareto-dominate inefficient ones, it is important to realize that, in 
general, this mechanism is not theoretically incentive compatible. Everyone making a claim 
equal to their individual value (the value to them of loss of access to the PA) is only an 
equilibrium under the unlikely scenario that 
1
N
j
j
V PP

 . Whenever 
1
N
j
j
V PP

 , this game 
provides incentives for the sum of claims to be equal to the PP, and thus, for individual 
11 
 
claims to exceed the true value of losses on average (that is, for WTA bids to be “too large”). 
The advantage of using the PPM is that, compared to an elicitation mechanism without a 
maximum level of compensation, the incentives of individual claimants are radically changed 
in the direction of more truthful revelation of real losses. An open-claims game without a 
PPM (and, by extension, a CV-WTA survey) is in fact a degenerate game since without a 
threshold, individual bids are not bounded from above at all. If individuals truly believed that 
their claim might be paid with some positive probability (however small) when there is no 
limit to the amount that can be paid, their optimal claim will be infinitely large. This could 
explain in part why the standard WTA format produces very large bids. The fact that CV-
WTA bids are not typically infinite may stem from the fact that individuals in these studies 
realize that there must be an implicit maximum to the amount of compensation that can 
realistically be paid out. The PPM has the advantage of making the existence of a limit 
explicit, and of clearly stating the consequences of exceeding it for everyone.
iii
    
 
Despite the fact that multiple equilibria make for weak theoretical predictions, laboratory 
experimentation with the PPM in the WTP context and some field applications in CV surveys 
provide useful insights on the empirical properties of the mechanism. Initial experimentation 
with threshold public goods in a WTP setting is attributed to Dawes et al. (1986), followed 
by Rapoport and Eshed–Levy (1989), Isaac et al. (1989),  Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) and 
Rapoport and Suleiman (1993). Each of these papers presents results demonstrating that it is 
possible to significantly increase voluntary contributions to a public good by adding a 
minimum threshold of contributions required before any good is provided. In these papers, 
results from base PPM treatments (the addition of a threshold only) are somewhat mitigated 
by the absence of either a money back rule if a group fails to reach the threshold, or of a 
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“rebate” rule defining how contributions in excess of the threshold are used (other than they 
are simply lost).
iv
  
 
Isaac et al. (1989) test a money back rule in experiments where subjects could contribute any 
amount and Rapoport and Eshed–Levy (1989) run similar experiments where 
participants can only make a binary choice of contributing a given amount or nothing. Both 
report significant increases in contribution rates when the money back rule is put in place. 
Only Dawes et al. (1986) fail to report increases in contributions after the addition of a 
money back rule. The only exhaustive study of alternative ways to employ excess 
contributions was conducted by Marks and Croson (1998) using a PPM with a money back 
rule. In the absence of a rebate rule, excess contributions are lost. This provides a deterrent to 
contribute large amounts. Marks and Croson (1998) report that extending benefits (using the 
added contribution to increase the size of the public good) has the greatest positive influence 
on contributions. A proportional rebate of excess contributions leads to increased 
contributions over a no rebate rule, but does slightly worse than the extension of benefits.  In 
our study, we adopt a proportional increase in claims because it is neither practical nor 
desirable to modify the size of the program based on the level of claims (i.e. imposing fewer 
restrictions on access when claims are lower than the funds available). 
 
Another set of experimental papers has focused on the relationship between individual 
contributions and the participant’s underlying value for the public good (i.e. at the threshold). 
While the PPM is not incentive compatible, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that the 
PPM can radically curtail free-riding, provide a more efficient level of public good provision, 
and improve demand revelation (Rondeau et al. 1999, Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Rose et al., 
2002; Messer et al., 2005).  In perhaps the most extensive study of the relationship between 
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contributions and underlying value, Rondeau et al (2005) point out that while the PPM 
produces contributions that are substantially closer to demand revelation than the equivalent 
voluntary contributions mechanism without a threshold, the PPM is not empirically demand 
revealing. If it was, a value of zero for the public good should produce no contribution, and 
bids should be perfectly correlated with value. Instead, they find that 1) a value of zero is 
predicted to yield strictly positive contributions; and 2) that increases in value result in a 
proportional but less than perfectly correlated increase in contributions. Such results are 
consistent with some form of warm glow, other-regarding preferences, or errors by subjects 
(Ferraro et al., 2003).  
           
Despite promising experimental evidence that the PPM results in more efficient voluntary 
provision of public goods, few have introduced it to hypothetical WTP surveys. Murphy et 
al. (2005) compare real and hypothetical payments to a land conservation organisation using 
a PPM in a laboratory environment. They observe a difference in amounts contributed 
between the two treatments and conclude from an analysis of additional survey questions that 
it stems from hypothetical bias rather than from free-riding. In other words, the PPM appears 
to perform well when real money is involved, but some hypothetical bias remains. In the only 
other field work we are aware of, Poe et al. (2002) and Ethier et al. (2000) compare the real 
sign-up rates to an environmental program against hypothetical open-ended and referendum 
format CV surveys. They find a weak hypothetical bias in the open-ended format, and a 
strong bias in the dichotomous choice referendum format.  
 
It is important to note that the PPM poses a difficult coordination problem (in equilibrium, 
aggregate contributions equal the PP). For this reason, some of the research on the PPM 
reported above implements a version of the mechanism where one or both of the PP or 
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number of participants (N) is not specified and where subjects do not know if they are all 
identical (Rondeau et al, 1999, 2005). The logic behind this design feature is that it prevents 
respondents from making contribution decisions influenced by some notion of equal cost 
sharing (PP/N). Such influence has the potential to distract participants away from a more 
careful consideration of their own gains from the public good. Whilst withholding 
information does not make the PPM incentive compatible, it may in practice bring individual 
claims closer to their true value. The evidence on whether or not this matters is inconclusive 
(Rondeau et al., 2005), although Bagnoli and McKee (1991) present results that clearly 
demonstrate how participants can coordinate on an equal cost sharing equilibrium when all 
subjects have identical preferences. It is nonetheless fortuitous that most previous 
experiments were conducted without the information required for the implementation of this 
focal point since, in the field survey reported here, it was not possible to specify with 
precision at the beginning of the study how many households would be eligible for 
compensation.  
 
One potential shortcoming of the PPM in the WTA context is that the mechanism gives each 
participant the power to veto the entire scheme by claiming an amount greater than the PP. 
There is no equivalent veto power in the PPM for WTP. As previously mentioned, protest 
bids are a common problem in WTA valuation exercises, and the PPM cannot be expected to 
eliminate true protest claims. The reasons behind such a protest response in any study may be 
difficult to ascertain. In cases such as that considered here, it may be due to cultural factors 
i.e. opposition to any form of control over local land access, or due to people having a grudge 
about being displaced from former traditional lands.  However, we posit that a credible PPM 
scenario should curtail the number of high claims that are not meant to be true protest bids or 
fundamental rejections of the scenario. At a minimum, the limit on the total amount that can 
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be paid out in compensation provides a strategic incentive to bring one’s claim closer to the 
true value of anticipated losses. If anything, PPM results might also make it easier to screen 
for true protest bids by comparing the distributions of bids across payment scenarios
v
. 
 
Summing up, if our understanding of the PPM in WTP context carries over to the WTA 
setting, the establishment of a PP should decrease the likelihood of individuals making bids 
that overstate their value by a large amount, giving a more accurate measure of true WTA. In 
our policy context, this would provide a useful tool for improving accuracy in the 
measurement of the economic costs of changes in local access arrangements to protected 
areas. In the next sections, we test this proposition empirically. 
  
III. Case Study Design 
A contingent valuation survey was administered in villages located in the vicinity of four 
protected areas in Uganda. Data were collected from households in communities around each 
of four different PAs. The surveys collected not only WTA responses, but also information 
on education level, household size, income sources and income group of each respondent. 
Table 1 provides details on the sampling regime. The four protected areas are ecologically 
different (tropical closed canopy rainforest, afro-montane forest and a savannah woodland 
and tropical closed canopy mix), implying that the value of access Vi (in terms of timber, 
NTFPs, fuelwood and bushmeat extracted) was expected to vary considerably both across 
and within areas.  
 
Sampling methods 
Site selection was based on finding PAs with similar historical levels of illegal park use as 
well as differing examples of existing governance strategies to resolve illegal use issues. The 
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sample population at each site is defined as all probable users of the PA. In practice this 
meant we focussed on parishes (Local Council II) with a political boundary bordering the 
park. The boundary defining potential users was identified as households that were at a 
maximum of two hours walk to the PA: that is, within around 5km of the PA. Beyond this 
distance, households were unlikely to view the PA as a potential resource for exploitation 
(Bush et al 2004). At the site level, stratification reflected socio-economic and topographic 
differences around the sites. Typically every n
th
 parish adjacent to the site was sampled at 
random (around 50% of parishes). A village (local council I) was then selected from within 
each parish at random from sub-strata of those villages adjacent to and non-adjacent to the 
park. Within each village a stratified (according to wealth ranking) proportionate random 
selection of around 30 households was drawn for interview, with half having the PPM 
treatment and the other half without. From these 30 households the application of the PPM 
treatment was at random selecting every n
th 
household in the stratified list. Finally heads of 
households were selected to act as respondents. However, usually all available members of 
the household were in attendance during the interview. This sampling regime was possible 
due to relatively recent census data available from the national statistics office and good 
information available in village level administrations
vi
.  
 
The cross-sectional data were collected during the period January-July 2006, with the survey 
team typically spending 3 days per village and six days in a parish. For example in Queen 
Elizabeth National Park the total time spent on the survey was of 36 days in and around the 
villages of the park. Surveying was conducted by trained research assistants, themselves from 
rural parts of the west and south western parts of Uganda, supervised full time by the lead 
researcher. The first day of the survey method also involved a participatory rural appraisal 
exercise exploring various household and institutional aspects of resource use. Finally, every 
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community was re-visited as part of a wider study funded by CARE International on rights 
and equity in PA management.  
 
Fuel wood was the main resource extracted by local households, followed by timber for 
construction, and bushmeat. In all sites, alternative sources of such goods were few e.g. 
natural forests resources or woodlots not privately owned or protected (Bush, 2009).  The 
history of protection also varies across the case study sites, with a much more recent 
introduction of access restrictions in Tengele than at the other three sites.  
 
Hypothetical scenario 
The payment scenario in the survey sets up a framework for the implementation of a 
hypothetical community-based park management scheme in collaboration with park 
management authorities, aimed at improving the conservation status and resource condition 
of protected areas. Discussion with respondents during the survey highlighted the costs and 
benefits to local people of their local PA, and the problems caused by current rates of illegal 
resource extraction such as declining stocks of fuelwood and declining populations of 
animals hunted for bushmeat. It was pointed out to respondents that such a rate of use was 
unsustainable, and would lead to future problems for local people in terms of sustaining their 
well-being. Respondents were then asked to state the minimum level of compensation 
(WTA) they required to forgo access to all resources from their local Protected Area for a 
period of one year, under a scheme in which surveillance and enforcement of access 
restrictions was implemented by a newly-formed community group. Examples were provided 
of possible actions by local people to aid enforcement, such as the reporting of illegal snares. 
Absent the implementation of such a compensation scheme, current over-use and illegal 
access would continue, with no compensation being paid to households.  
18 
 
 
Two separate payment scenarios were employed in the study. The control treatment is an 
open-ended CV format in which respondents were simply asked to state their WTA 
compensation to forgo the benefits from the PA for one year. This provides a basis for 
comparing the results of the second treatment, which included a PPM. In each of the 
communities surveyed, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the two treatments 
(i.e. with or without the PPM). An open-ended CV format was chosen based on the 
experience gained in an extensive pilot testing of the study.  As noted by many authors (e.g. 
Champ and Bishop, 2006), no elicitation method is problem free. Of direct relevance to this 
paper is the work by Poe et al. (2002), who found an open-ended design WTP with a PPM 
resulted in lower levels of hypothetical bias than a referendum format WTP with a PPM. In a 
comparable study to ours using a WTA format in Nepal, Shrestha et al (2007) also use at 
open-ended payment mechanism. They find that this open-ended design works well in 
estimating the costs to local people of access restrictions in the Koshi Tappu Wildlife 
Reserve. Whilst it would have been interesting to include alternative payment elicitation in 
the present study, resource constraints and pre-testing results meant that we focussed on an 
open-ended payment design alone.  
 
In the PPM version of the questionnaire, the PPM was explained in the following fashion: 
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Training and pre-testing was carried out at Queen Elizabeth National Park, and involved a 
week of theoretical and practical  training on the survey methods for the survey personnel 
followed by a full pilot run of the entire survey method in a park-adjacent community. A full 
debriefing covering every aspect of the pilot survey was conducted every evening, and any 
ambiguities in the survey questionnaires were addressed. Surveying was rigorously 
supervised to ensure that enumerators complied with established procedures, and that 
communities were visited according to the random sample selection made from the site 
sampling frame. Pre-testing was conducted to identify weaknesses in the presentation and 
comprehension of the questionnaire by both the enumerators and respondents, and to 
determine the most appropriate response formats to different questions. In general there was 
consensus from enumerators that the scenario was found to be credible by respondents. The 
scenario addressed both a real conservation issue (illegal use) and an appropriate response to 
resolving it (direct payments for conservation in response to community-led enforcement).  
 
It typically took the team of 5 enumerators about 3 days in each community to complete the 
interviews. During this period the research team either found local lodgings or camped within 
the community. The extended period of contact with local people allowed the team to 
“..The community is being asked to make monetary bids to assess the demand for such a scheme and 
estimate the level of compensation.  Only a limited amount of funds are available for such a scheme. If the 
sum of all the household compensation bids is less than or equal to the money available then the scheme 
would go ahead as described, and a proportional share of any surplus funds between the communities’ bids 
and the compensation fund will be made.  
 
If the sum is more than the money available then such a scheme would not go ahead and it is likely that the 
current situation would continue...” 
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develop a high degree of familiarity with the social and natural environment of each 
community. This often gave opportunities to discuss responses and resolve sampling 
problems. For example, amongst some of the diverse local cultures in which the survey was 
administered, it was culturally taboo to tell strangers how many children or livestock the 
household has for fear of bringing bad luck.  However it is not a social taboo for neighbours 
or other local key informants to divulge information about neighbours’ situations, so 
information could be gathered in this way. An estimate of total household income (adjusted 
per adult equivalent unit) was made so that households could be allocated to income quartiles 
as a basis for comparison. An assessment was made of the demographic composition of each 
household, level of education, and employment. Data was also collected on total household 
income from the sale of PA and non-PA goods. Further information on the survey procedures 
and market price results can be found in Bush et al (2011). 
 
IV. Results 
A total of 690 households were contacted. Ten questionnaires were discarded as incomplete. 
A further 5 questionnaires were discarded because respondents did not want to answer the 
WTA question, leaving 675 usable surveys included in the analysis (Table One).  
 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables collected by group: the first panel shows 
statistics related to households treated with the PPM (N = 338) while the second panel shows 
statistics for the control group of respondents (N = 337).
vii
 A definition of each variable can 
be found in Table 3.  
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In general, treated households (those given the PPM version of the survey) are more educated 
than the control group (those not given the PPM version). For example, around 27% of the 
treated group received primary education compared to 23% of the non-treated. Mean 
household size is 6.3 persons in the treated group (with a standard deviation of 2.7), while it 
is slightly lower in the non-treated group (around 6 with a standard deviation of 2.5).  Net 
annual adjusted household income does not seem to be different among the groups, but is 
more dispersed in the PPM than in the control sample. Distances between the household’s 
dwelling and a market or the PA do not seem to be different across groups (3.17 Km and 3.09 
Km for the PPM and control samples respectively).  
 
Households in the study area are highly reliant on natural resources. Fewer than 2% of 
interviewed households have sources of income other than agriculture, livestock or the PA.  
Here, PA related income is defined as the market value of resources extracted from protected 
areas, whether consumed within the household or sold. Across the different regions, the 
largest fraction of household income derived from PAs in the last twelve months was 5% in 
Tengele. Almost no income from use of the PA is reported for Bwindi. As noted above, 
however, the economic value of access is likely to be larger than income earned since access 
to the PA offers other indirect benefits such as access to resources at times when other 
income sources are low or unexpectedly reduced, whilst cultural importance may also be 
attached to access 
 
Analysis of Contingent Valuation responses 
WTA bids were solicited in the local currency (Ugandan Shillings, UGS), but results are 
presented here in US$
viii
. A total of four zero bids were recorded out of the 675 completed 
surveys. Where such a zero response to the WTA question was received, clarification was 
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sought from the respondent. All four zero bids were consistent with a zero value attached to 
PA access and were coded accordingly.  
 
As argued earlier, introducing the PPM is expected to lower mean WTA. We also expect the 
variance to fall if the main effect is to reduce WTA claims without drastically modifying the 
overall shape of the distribution. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the two 
treatments. The mean WTA with the PPM is US$354 per household (with a standard 
deviation of US$320), compared to US$482 without the PPM (with a much larger standard 
deviation of US$541). As expected, the PPM lowers the standard error of the mean (US$17 
compared to US$29) and results in a lower maximum bid value (US$1,579 compared to 
US$3,158) than the control treatment. The difference between the mean WTA across the two 
groups is statistically significant using different tests (see Table 3). One-way ANOVA shows 
that the equality among groups can be rejected at 1% significance level. However, one-way 
ANOVA assumes equal population variance. In a Bartlett’s chi-squared test, the hypothesis 
that variances are equal across treatments is rejected at the 1% significance level (χ2 = 88.5). 
We therefore applied a non-parametric analogue to the one-way ANOVA, namely the 
Kruskal–Wallis test. In this case, we once again reject the null hypothesis of equality of 
means across groups at the 1% significance level (Newbold et al. 2003).  
 
Initial evidence therefore strongly hints at a significant difference between the two 
distributions of WTA in the expected direction. These results could, however, be driven by 
outliers. Figure 1 presents two histograms of the claims using all observations in the sample 
(N=675). Twelve observations are above US$2,000 and they all belong to the control group. 
More specifically, three individuals report a WTA equal to US$2,105, one individual is 
willing to accept US$2,526, seven respondents report US$2,631 and one reports a bid of 
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US$3,157. In order to identify whether the effect of introducing a PPM is more pervasive 
than simply affecting the upper tail of the distribution, it is useful to run WTA tests on 
samples from which the “outlier” observations have been eliminated. Even when all 12 
potential outlier observations are eliminated, the probability that the mean WTA of the two 
groups are equal is well below 10% in a two-sided test
ix
. These results also show no hint that 
the PPM induces respondents to increase their bid in an effort to get authorities to put in 
place a larger compensation fund.  
 
Since we believe that using the PPM sample claims are closer to true values than control 
treatment responses, our best estimate of the mean welfare loss to households from access 
restrictions to protected areas is therefore $354/household/year. In the next section, we will 
employ a more formal analysis using regression (with sampling weights) and matching 
estimators, but this will not change this figure substantially. The figure can be interpreted as 
an upper bound on the per-household “cost of conservation” for access to the protected areas 
studied. Our estimate of WTA is quite high relative to the mean annual income of $1,011 per 
household. However, despite obvious difficulties involved in comparing across similar 
studies undertaken by other authors, we also note that our mean WTA estimate is not out of 
line with comparable estimates of WTA to forego access to resources in other developing 
countries. A study in Madagascar in 1995 (Shyamsundar and Kramer, 1996) valued local 
access forgone form a forest in a similar scenario at $108.34/hsld. A more recent study in 
Nepal (Shrestha et al., 2007) valued mean local losses from foregone access to Koshi Tappu 
Wildlife Reserve at $238/hsld. Allowing for a mean annual global inflation figure of 3.8% 
and purchasing power parity differences between countries this gives adjusted values of 
approximately $213/hsld. (Madagascar) and $280/hsld. (Nepal)
x
.   
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The analysis so far has focused on direct comparisons of WTA distributions across groups 
without accounting for underlying differences in the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
respondents. Table 2 clearly indicated that some differences do exist across groups. A probit 
regression can provide a diagnostic on whether the probability of belonging to the treated 
group is correlated with one or more household characteristics. This shows that the treatment 
and control groups are statistically different in the size of their arable land holding (see Table 
5). However, the size of the effect on the probability of being in the treated group does not 
seem substantial. For example, a one standard deviation change in hectares of land around 
the mean will increase the probability of being in the treated group by only 5 percentage 
points. Note that none of the other variables which might indicate an undesirable selection 
effect operating (such as distance to market, or protected area income) in being in the PPM 
treatment are statistically significant. Given this, the next section is devoted to a more formal 
analysis of WTA by regressing it on a dummy variable TREATED (associated with the PPM 
sample) and a set of controls in order to account for variables that help determine household 
WTA.  
 
Econometric analysis, basic models 
A WTA bid curve was estimated using different specifications (Table 6). These provide more 
formal tests of the impact of the PPM on WTA, and more precisely identify the determinants 
of the costs of conservation measures.  The basic econometric specification is given by the 
following equation (4): 
 
WTAi =  0 + 1(TREATEDi) + f(Xi) + i        (4) 
 
25 
 
where TREATED is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual belong to the 
group subject to the PPM and 0 otherwise; f(Xi) includes the following set of control 
variables: education level, household size, the size of the household arable land holding, the 
value of total assets owned by the household, household income and an estimate of PA-
related income, distance to nearest market, distance to PA, and three site dummies to 
represent un-observed variations in access benefits unique to each PA. The list of variables 
included in our survey is thought to cover the variables most likely to explain the 
compensation required by households. The loss of access to resources within PAs might 
depend on household’s ability to collect resources from the PA (proxied here by household 
size), on alternative (substitute) sources of income (measured here by the amount of 
agricultural land cultivated by the household), and on how much income the household 
reports that it collected from being able to access the PA in the past. The area of agricultural 
land owned by a household might also partly determine the damages they would suffer from 
crop raiding from wild animals, thus the sign on this variable is hard to determine a priori. 
We also included variables measuring how far the household lives from the nearest market, 
and how far they live from the PA (as a measure of accessibility), since other studies have 
shown these to be important drivers of income from protected areas (Vedeld et al., 2004; 
Foerster et al, 2011; Sukanda et al, 2010), whilst distance to market may also explain the 
ability to substitute away from PA income. Dummies are included to represent either the un-
observed characteristics of each sampling location (site) or different management regimes 
(since to each site corresponds a different governance regime), which might impact on the 
value of access to PAs. The omitted site is Queen Elizabeth National Park. Standard errors 
have been adjusted for clustering within village to account for possible intra-correlation at 
village level in the WTA responses (see, e.g., William, 2000), whilst we use sampling 
weights based on (i) the probability of a particular village being selected for sampling, (ii) the 
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probability of each household in any village being selected and (iii) the probability of being 
in the control group rather than the treated group. Including all the variables above without 
imputing missing values would have reduced the sample to 470 observations. This is because 
the variable “distance to nearest market” has many missing values. Excluding the distance 
variable from the regressors leaves 620 usable observations. For this reason, the OLS model 
in the third column of Table 6 excludes the distance from market variable – this is re-
introduced in Table 7 as part of robustness checks.  
 
In order to verify whether PPM has a significant effect on the value of bids the following null 
hypothesis is tested: 
 
H0: 1= 0 .           (5) 
 
where 1 is the parameter estimate on the variable TREATED. The first column of Table 6 
shows the results of a simple OLS specification in which the bid is regressed against the 
variable TREATED without controls. The null hypothesis in (5) is rejected at 1% 
significance level. The second column shows the results of a model that controls for 
individual variables (education, income, etc.) while in the third column location variables 
have been added. Table 6 is useful because it clearly shows that the coefficient on the 
variable TREATED is negative and strongly significant no matter what controls have been 
added, confirming the previous findings that the PPM reduces WTA bids. In addition, we 
reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level that the PPM and control group surveys 
yield the same WTA claims. After controlling for confounding factors and systematic 
differences among the groups, a household in the PPM treatment group would bid on average 
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approximately US$119 less than a comparable household in the control group. This analysis 
confirms that the PPM has a considerable effect on stated WTA.  
 
Households with a larger area of agricultural land to cultivate state significantly higher WTA 
amounts. Respondents with more agricultural land to cultivate may be considering 
compensation in terms of potential reparations against losses from crop raiding, rather than 
just the opportunity cost of reduced access to the PA. Indeed, crop raiding was an issue in all 
sites and in participatory exercises was always amongst the top three qualitative costs of 
living adjacent to the PA. Annual total household income and asset variables do not have a 
statistically significant relationship with WTA. However, annual income from the protected 
area has a positive and statistically significant impact on WTA, which makes intuitive sense. 
The number of occupants in a household is correlated with lower WTA bids, although the 
effect is not statistically significant. No significant effects are observed for distance to the 
protected area, a result that could be attributed to insufficient variability in the data for this 
variable.  
 
The last rows provide the mean predicted value of treated and control groups. These values 
have been estimated by taking the average of the linear prediction of each regression when 
TREATED takes the value of 1, yielding the mean predicted WTA of the treated, and when 
TREATED takes the value of 0, providing the mean predicted WTA of the control group. As 
expected, adding controls lead to a lower value of the (mean predicted) WTA. The value 
corresponding to the treated group is our preferred estimate of the cost of conservation of the 
average household and is in the range of US$340-$370. 
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Tests of misspecification, omitted variables and robustness. 
A battery of tests was run to verify that our findings are robust under different hypothesis, 
assumptions and specifications. These are reported in Table 7. The severity of multi-
collinearity among explanatory variables was checked using the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) comparison. VIF estimates for the regressors showed that there were no serious multi-
collinearity problems. All the variables have a value lower than 2.5. 
xi
 Although the low R-
squared of our basic models does not invalidate the mean WTA measure, it can be argued 
that it may have consequences in term of the statistical significance of the coefficient on 
TREATED if relevant variables have been omitted. In our study households were randomly 
assigned to the PPM treatment. A formal test of omitted variables (known as the RESET test) 
can be conducted by adding the powers of the predicted WTA to the set of regressors and 
checking for the statistical significance of these power terms. The null hypothesis of no 
omitted variable cannot be rejected at any level standard level of significance also when 
adding up to three powers of predicted WTA ( F(3, 605) =168 ), p-value =0.17). The RESET 
test also suggests that a linear model is the correct specification.  
 
As a further test of specification of our WTA model, a Box-Cox model that includes linear 
and log-linear models as special cases was run: 
 
(WTA
θ
 – 1)/ θ = 0 + 1(TREATEDi) + f(Xi) + i       (6) 
 
and the results are reported in the first column of Table 7. The Box-Cox model with general θ 
is difficult to interpret and use. However, the TREATED variable is negative rejecting the 
null hypothesis (4) once again, and the estimate of θ is 0.06 is not statistically significant, 
which gives more support for a log-linear model (θ = 0) than the linear model (θ = 1). 
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Because of this, the second column of Table 6 reports the result of a log-linear WTA model 
(see Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The log-linear specification does not affect the previous 
findings. For the sake of simplicity we therefore keep a linear specification for what follows. 
We also allow for the true distribution of WTA amounts being censored at zero by using 
Tobit regression (Halstead et al., 1991). The third column of Table 7 shows that the effects of  
TREATED and the rest of the variables do not vary significantly when modelling the data 
using such a Tobit regression. 
  
What if the conditional tests just run are affected by the presence of a few individuals who 
mistakenly over state their WTA? The fourth column of Table 7 shows the effect of 
TREATED on WTA when dropping the single observation in which bid was greater than 
US$ 3,000 (as we did in the simple unconditional test). Dropping that observation has the 
expected effect of lowering the difference between the WTA stated by the treated and non-
treated group by about US$5: an individual participating in a PPM survey states a claim that 
is on average US$84 smaller than somebody answering the control survey (not a substantial 
difference from our baseline difference of US$89). The fifth column brings this concept a bit 
further and considers as “outliers” all the claims in the regular scenario that are higher than 
the largest claim in the PPM group, i.e., we drop all the bids higher than US$1,900. Even in 
the very unlikely scenario that all these observations are “outliers”, the coefficient on the 
PPM is still negative and significant at 5% level. Rejecting these eleven highest claims in the 
control group halves the difference in WTA between the two groups but it still averages 
US$38 suggesting that part of the difference might be inflated because of these 11 
observations.  
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The sixth column of Table 7 extends the concept of outliers to all observations that may have 
unusual “influence” in determining coefficient estimates. Influential observations can be 
detected using several measures. A common measure is dfits (see Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). Large absolute values of dfits indicate an influential data point. A rule of thumb 
suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) among others is that the observations with the 
absolute value of dfits greater than 2*(square root of (number of parameters/sample size)) 
may be worthy of further investigation. The model presented in column six shows that even 
eliminating all these observations does not change our key result on the effects of the PPM 
treatment. The next column shows the estimates from OLS regression when distance to 
market is added as an independent variable. Although we have formally tested for omitted 
variables, distance to market might be an important determinant of WTA, but this variable 
was dropped from baseline models because of many missing values. When included in the 
regression, the coefficient on distance to market is not statistically significant. More 
importantly, adding this variable to the model does not have any significant impact on the 
other coefficient estimates, and does not affect the conclusions we have already reached on 
the effect of the PPM. 
xii
 
 
Finally, we have used a different econometrics technique, propensity score matching 
estimator (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). The propensity score was computed by estimating a 
probit regression of being TREATED on the same covariates used in the previous 
regressions. This estimator then compares the WTA of households who based on our 
covariates have a very similar probability of receiving treatment (similar propensity score). 
The difference between WTA between households who received the PPM and who did not 
can be interpreted as average treatment effects. None of the observations fall off the region of 
common support when matching on 2, 4 or 6 nearest neighbours. The difference between 
31 
 
treatment and control group varies between 121, 97 and 100, respectively and is always 
statistically significant at 1% level ; values that are comparable to the OLS estimates. Table 7 
shows the coefficient of one of the models estimated where the observations where matched 
on propensity scores paired to the closest 4 matches
xiii
.  The difference between treated and 
un-treated WTA is $97 in this matching model. 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper investigates the use of a Provision Point Mechanism (PPM) to estimate the 
opportunity costs of conservation actions to local people, using Willingness to Accept 
(WTA) contingent valuation approach. As we noted earlier, researchers have become 
reluctant to use WTA approaches even when the distribution of property rights (whether de 
facto or de jure) suggests that compensation-based welfare measures are more appropriate 
than payment-based measures. This has been attributed to the tendency of WTA questions in 
hypothetical markets to lead to the over-statement of true losses, and to encourage protest 
bidding. Our main focus in this paper was a methodological one, to devise a strategy (the 
PPM) which reduces the problems of applying WTA-measures to estimates of the costs of 
conservation. 
 
By extending the basic idea of the PPM from a willingness to pay context, we show that a 
WTA-PPM can significantly reduce the magnitude of mean hypothetical WTA in a way 
consistent with theoretical predictions that the PPM improves demand-revelation. 
Empirically, the most notable difference between the distributions of claims under the two 
payment mechanisms are at the upper end of the distribution, although our analysis 
demonstrates that use of the PPM has a statistically significant effect throughout the 
distribution. The significant decrease in the number of claims that could be considered 
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protest bids or outliers suggests that the PPM mechanism could facilitate the applications of 
WTA designs in contingent valuation (or, indeed, in choice modelling) when compensation is 
the appropriate welfare framework to adopt.  
 
A wide range of factors, including historical variation in conflicts and participation, will 
impact on peoples’ perceptions of the value of losses in access to PAs. A more complete 
understanding of what drives differences in perceptions of losses across people would need 
to take into account this wider range of factors. However, from a sample selection 
perspective, the variation of the impacts of such issues are likely to be homogeneous between 
the treatment groups (PPM and no PPM), and thus not likely to bias the findings of our study 
in terms of the effects of the PPM.  
 
The choice of the WTA approach is policy relevant in that compensation for loss of access to 
forest resources (based on rights to use) is becoming more widely discussed in policy and 
management circles, especially conserving forests in the context of carbon financing and 
REDD+. Here we use the term “compensation” in the sense of providing some benefit 
specifically to offset loss of access (opportunity cost),  rather than to offset costs such as crop 
raiding due to proximity to a PA, be they at an individual or group  e.g. community level. In 
terms of local level compensation, a tourism revenue sharing program was explicitly set up in 
Uganda to provide community level benefits from the national parks to offset such costs of 
living next to protected areas as an incentive to promote good will towards the PA. Anecdotal 
evidence and research in the grey literature suggests that what heterogeneous park adjacent 
households need are interventions that directly affect the most high risk (in terms of 
dependence on illegal PA use) households, in terms of offsetting opportunity costs of reduced 
resource access through effective implementation of management regulations. The pre-
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testing and focus group discussion work carried out in our study in every village prior to 
survey administration helped to develop a comprehension of the plausibility of the 
compensation scenario.   
 
For the case of protected areas in Uganda, use of the use of a WTA format is more 
appropriate than asking a WTP question. Local people living in and around the four protected 
areas (PAs) in Uganda have depended on access to these areas for fuelwood, bushmeat and 
non-timber forest products, particularly at times of the year when other sources of 
subsistence are very limited. Exploiting such resources is a livelihood strategy which these 
very poor households employ irrespective of current legal restrictions.  Since international 
treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity have stated that use of protected areas 
as a way of safeguarding biodiversity should not come at the cost of perpetuating or 
worsening poverty, finding ways of measuring the true opportunity costs of conservation to 
communities in developing countries is important.  Determinants of WTA here were found to 
include access to agricultural land and household size; whilst mean compensation demanded 
also varied to a degree across protected areas. This variation across PAs could be due to a 
variation in both the productivity of the four different ecosystems, and the governance 
arrangements currently in place in each. 
 
We have also argued that measuring the financial cost of loss of access to PAs would under-
estimate the welfare loss to such households, and indeed found that our WTA estimates were 
much higher than the financial value of lost access, which averaged US$21/household, 
varying from almost zero (Bwindi) to $44 (Tengele), with higher absolute values for richer 
households (Bush et al. 2011). Whilst there is good reason to suppose that the WTA estimate 
in the PPM treatment is still biased upwards due to hypothetical market effects, a strong 
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argument can still be made that the true costs of loss of access to PAs is greater than $21 per 
household for the reasons explained above.  
 
To date, much of the environmental economics literature has been devoted to estimating the 
benefits of conserving the world’s biodiversity and its most valuable ecosystems  (Kontoleon 
et al., 2007). Establishing protected areas is a dominant means of achieving such 
conservation world-wide. However, the costs of conserving biodiversity in developing 
countries can fall disproportionately on poor households.  As an imperative the full range of 
costs of conservation need to be quantified, and ways sought to mitigate these, if effective 
levels of conservation are to be achieved without exacerbating poverty. On the basis of work 
reported here, we suggest that a WTA approach incorporating a PPM is worthy of further 
investigation as part of the economist’s toolbox.  However, many important methodological 
questions remain unanswered. Future experimental work could investigate the role of the 
PPM in mitigating hypothetical bias relative to its effect on pure strategic behaviour. It is also 
unclear how important the use of a PPM is in moderating protest bids, since very low levels 
of protesting were found in our survey. Finally, the extent to which respondent behaviour is 
motivated by an attempt to influence the level of an eventual compensation fund is also an 
issue that should be investigated 
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Table 1 Data collection sample frame by protected area and treatment application 
 
Protected Area Bio Type Governance Type No of 
Households in 
survey 
Treatment applications 
With 
PPM 
Without 
PPM 
No Bid 
Queen Elizabeth 
National Park 
Savannah 
Woodland & 
Grassland 
Strict National Park 
(no community co-
management) 
329 
(11 
communities) 
167 162 0 
Bwindi 
Impenetrable 
Forest National 
Park 
Afromontane 
Forest 
National Park with 
some community 
co-management 
232 
(8 communities 
114 117 1 
Budongo Forest 
Community 
Forest Reserve 
(Masindi District) 
Tropical High 
(Closed Canopy) 
Forest 
Forest on private 
land, community 
owned and 
managed 
60 
(2 communities) 
31 29 0 
Tengele Forest, 
Collaborative 
Forest 
Management 
Tropical High 
(Closed Canopy) 
Forest 
Forest Reserve 
(public land), with 
community co- 
management 
59 
(2 communities) 
26 29 4 
  Total households 680 338 337 5 
(Data collected January to July 2006) 
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Table 2  Sample descriptive characteristics (Variable descriptions in table 3) 
 
Variable N Mean St Dev Min Max % 
 
Treated with PPM 
 
WTA 338 354 320 0 1,579 - 
EDGROUP1 92 - - - - 27.3 
EDGROUP2 90 - - - - 26.71 
EDGROUP3 75 - - - - 22.26 
EDGROUP4 80 - - - - 23.74 
HHTOTALO 338 6.33 2.68 1 15 - 
AGRILAND 314 5.24 9.38 0 80 - 
NTHIUS 338 658.77 2,346.64 0 36,812.79 - 
NPAIUS 338 5.67 23.93 0 263.16 - 
ASSETVALUE 338 189,401 769,871 0 8,222,000 - 
DISTMARK 264 3.17 3.14 0 10 - 
DISTPA 334 1.55 1.74 0 14 - 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- 
Not treated with PPM 
WTA 337 482 541 0 3158  
EDGROUP1 75 - - - - 22.19 
EDGROUP2 77 - - - - 22.78 
EDGROUP3 95 - - - - 28.11 
EDGROUP4 91 - - - - 26.92 
HHTOTALO 337 5.98 2.55 1 16 - 
AGRILAND 314 3.99 5.56 0 55 - 
NTHIUS 337 613.87 1879.76 0.00 27500.00 - 
NPAIUS 337 36.69 304.15 0.00 4547.37 - 
ASSETVALUE 337 145,186 689,657 0 10,730,000 - 
DISTMARK 254 3.09 3.45 0 10 - 
DISTPA 333 1.55 1.67 0 14 - 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 3 - Variable descriptions for determinants of bid value 
 
Variable Description 
WTA Willingness to Accept variable in US dollars per household 
TREATED        The group treated with PPM takes value of 1, while group not subject to PPM 
takes value of 0. 
EDGROUP1 Education level that corresponds to no formal education 
EDGROUP2 Education level that corresponds to primary education 
EDGROUP3 Education level that corresponds to secondary education 
EDGROUP4 Education level that corresponds to tertiary education 
HHTOTALO       Household total occupants; total number of individuals in the household 
irrespective of age/sex class 
AGRILAND      Agricultural land (Ha.); area of agricultural land cultivated by the household 
(arable land holding) 
NTHI          Net annual total household income   
NPAI Net annual protected area income  
DISTMARK       Distance to market (Km); distance from households dwelling to travel to nearest 
market 
DISTPA         Distance to PA  (Km); distance from household’s dwelling to the protected area 
boundary 
BWINDI Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent lives in Bwindi site, = 
0 otherwise 
BUDONGO Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent lives in the Budongo 
site, = 0 otherwise 
TENGELE Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent lives in the Tengele 
site, = 0 otherwise 
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Table 4 Impacts of the PPM treatment on mean WTA and statistical tests of WTA 
differences across treated and control groups 
 
  
Groups N Mean St Dev Min Max 
 
Treated with PPM 338 354 320 0 1,579 
Control 337 482 541 0 3,158 
 
One-way ANOVA 
Source  SS   df  MS  F    Prob > F 
Between groups    2770480.52   1  2770480.52  14.05    0.0002 
Within groups     132691875  673  197164.748   
Total       135462356    674    200982.724   
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(1) =  88.4971  Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
 
Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric equality of population rank test 
Groups N Rank sum 
 
Treated with PPM 338           107688 
Control 337           120462 
chi-squared =     6.698 with 1 d.f. probability =     0.0097 
 
Notes: (i) all monetary amounts are in US dollars.  
Variable definitions and unit of measures given in Table 3 
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Table 5 Probit analysis of belonging to the treated group 
 
   
DEP VAR = TREATED Coefficients Standard errors 
   
EDGROUP 0.138 (0.084) 
HHTOTALO -0.012 (0.029) 
AGRILAND 0.016* (0.009) 
NTHI in thousand US$ -0.004 (0.024) 
NPAI in thousand US$ -2.575 (1.866) 
DISTMARKET -0.001 (0.020) 
DISTPA 0.023 (0.034) 
BWINDI 0.210 (0.218) 
BUDONGO 0.051 (0.219) 
TENGELE 0.338 (0.233) 
Constant -0.404* (0.227) 
   
N 470  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Variable definitions given in Table 3 
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 Table 6 Econometric analysis of determinants of WTA bid value( basic models) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES bid bid bid 
        
Treated -82.555*** -95.634*** -95.722*** 
 
(22.871) (25.015) (24.268) 
EDGROUP 
 
24.508 27.144 
  
(18.251) (16.419) 
HHTOTALO 
 
4.257 1.218 
  
(7.683) (6.984) 
NTHI in thousand US$ 
 
-3.468 -3.199 
  
(9.068) (8.707) 
NPAI in US$ 
 
0.238*** 0.247*** 
  
(0.046) (0.036) 
ASSETVALUE 
 
0.003 0.010 
  
(0.016) (0.018) 
AGRILAND 
 
5.125** 5.460** 
  
(2.028) (2.238) 
DISTPA 
  
4.791 
   
(9.687) 
BWINDI 
  
10.829 
   
(44.619) 
BUDONGO 
  
26.669 
   
(32.892) 
TENGELE 
  
-136.167*** 
   
(27.735) 
Constant 453.417*** 320.711*** 324.481*** 
 
(30.197) (49.596) (54.344) 
    Observations 675 628 620 
R-squared 0.010 0.052 0.064 
Mean predicted WTA of treated (US dollars)         370.8         342.1         338.7 
Mean predicted WTA of control (US dollars)         453.4         431.8         427.3 
 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered at village level, and are shown in parentheses. Key:  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 Mean predicted WTA of the treated is the linear prediction of WTA when 
TREATED takes the value of one, while mean predicted WTA of the control group is the linear 
prediction of WTA when TREATED takes the value of zero.  Variable definitions are given in Table 
3. Sampling weights were used to account for selection probability. See text for details. 
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Table 7 Robustness checks on regression models of determinants of WTP 
 
VARIABLES 
Box Cox Log-linear Tobit 
OLS 
Eliminating 
bids>US$3000 
OLS 
Eliminating 
bids>US$1900 
OLS Eliminating 
abs(dfits)<2*threshold 
OLS adding 
distance to 
market 
Nearest 
Neighbour 
Matching  
  
 
              
Treated -0.348 -0.210** -97.172*** -90.205*** -53.036* -82.821*** -88.104*** -97.03*** 
  
(0.079) (32.836) (24.105) (27.074) (26.905) (26.256) 
 EDGROUP 0.19 0.100** 26.351 25.982 29.811* 32.838** 25.960 Yes 
  
(0.043) (22.371) (16.548) (14.387) (15.496) (18.530) 
 HHTOTALO -0.004 0.008 1.502 1.952 6.700 4.148 -2.890 Yes 
  
(0.014) (7.437) (6.958) (5.164) (5.477) (8.840) 
 NTHI in thousand US$ -0.003 -0.014 -2.994 -2.660 -0.880 -14.717*** -3.135 Yes 
  
(0.019) (8.196) (8.649) (8.469) (4.164) (8.505) 
 NPAI in US$ 0.001 0.000*** 0.247*** 0.249*** 0.029 0.050 0.250*** Yes 
  
(0.000) (0.079) (0.035) (0.031) (0.052) (0.032) 
 ASSETVALUE -0.001 0.000 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.019 Yes 
  
(0.000) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.074) 
 AGRILAND 0.021 0.014** 5.552** 5.221** 4.664** 7.148*** 5.217* Yes 
  
(0.005) (2.422) (2.211) (1.966) (1.806) (2.488) 
 DISTPA 0.005 0.013 4.347 4.891 2.843 4.705 3.898 Yes 
  
(0.025) (10.275) (9.704) (9.241) (7.985) (12.723) 
 DISTMARKET 
 
     
4.282 Yes 
       
(8.496) 
 BWINDI 0.008 0.002 3.896 14.826 22.712 10.937 96.204 Yes 
  
(0.119) (44.044) (43.946) (43.524) (41.126) (76.160) 
 BUDONGO 0.047 0.012 25.727 31.492 -24.553 -52.262 32.396 Yes 
  
(0.124) (77.695) (31.654) (35.513) (32.808) (32.326) 
 TENGELE -0.548 -0.377*** -137.055*** -131.442*** -99.790*** -122.988*** -170.019*** Yes 
  
(0.093) (51.611) (26.070) (27.150) (23.952) (37.240) 
 Constant 6.39 5.316*** 325.882*** 315.583*** 246.844*** 284.576*** 337.537*** Yes 
  
(0.131) (77.033) (51.324) (45.930) (47.281) (56.043) 
 θ 0.064 
       
 
-0.043 
       σ 
  
413.9*** 
     
   
-34.81 
     Number of matches 
       
4 
         Number of observations off the 
common support 
       
0 
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       Observations 616 616 620 619 609 611 470 620 
R-squared   0.067   0.065 0.053 0.061 0.075   
         Mean predicted WTA of the 
treated  238.4 
335.8 338.8 342.5 339.9 354.1 347.6 
         
Mean predicted WTA of the 
control  
285 425.8 422.1 380.3 405.8 442.1 
441.6 
                  
 
Note: Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Mean predicted WTA of the treated group is the linear prediction of WTA when TREATED takes the value of one, while mean predicted WTA of the control group is the 
linear prediction of WTA when TREATED takes the value of zero. The values appearing in the second column referring to the log-linear model refers to the exponential 
transformation of the predicted WTA. “Yes” in the last column indicates the variables over which the matching occurred.   
 
Sampling weights were used to account for selection probability. See text for details.  
 
Variable definitions given in Table 3. 
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Figure 1 – Distribution of WTA bids among treated and non-treated groups
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i
 In addition to the loss of access, communities also face considerable threats from crop 
raiding animals residing within protected areas. This can impose significant costs on local 
communities. In some cases these losses may be offset by the benefits of bushmeat supply 
(Hulme and Infield, 2001). Losses due to crop damages was reported by participants of our 
study as a significant issue (Bush and Mwesigwa, 2007).  
ii
 Without loss of generality, Vi =v(Y;X) is taken to represent the actual value lost by an 
individual following the imposition of access restrictions. This value can depend on a number 
of determinants (Y) such as the proximity to the area, household access to substitute 
resources or markets, etc; and on households characteristics (X). Since some individuals may 
plan to violate those restrictions and continue with some level of illegal resource extraction, 
Vi (and therefore the individual’s claim on the compensation fund) may not represent the full 
value of current resource usage.  
iii
 Of course, individuals also could have claims of losses that are genuinely close to infinity 
if the PA’s provide life sustaining resources and have no substitutes. In this case, 
compensation fund would not be sufficient to pay claims and the no-policy outcome would 
be efficient.  
iv
 In the WTA context, the money back rule corresponds to the fact that all claims are ignored 
when the PP is exceeded (i.e. all claims are “returned”). The rebate rule is the proportional 
formula determining that households would receive a share of the unclaimed funds if the sum 
of claims is less than the amount of funds available.    
v
 It is worth noting that if respondents think that the size of the compensation fund is 
endogenous to the responses in the survey, they might increase their bids in an attempt to 
increase the size of the compensation fund. Which of the two opposite effect (if any) 
dominates is therefore an empirical question. 
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vi
 Note that in the regression results reported in Tables 6 and 7, we use a weighed regression 
procedure based on sampling probabilities. 
vii
 From here on, we will refer to the “treated” group as the group of respondents that were 
subjected to PPM, and the “control” as the group that was not treated with the PPM.  
viii
 Exchange rate in 2008 was 1900 UG shillings = 1 US$. 
ix
 One-way ANOVA reports F =3.78 with probability greater than F = 0.052. Kruskal-Wallis 
reports Chi-squared equal to 3.373 with probability = 0.066. 
x
 3.8% is the IMF mean rate of inflation since 1980, PPP conversions are made using the 
World Bank GDP (PPP) per capita values for 2008. 
xi
 A VIF greater than 10 is usually taken as indicative of a problem (Kennedy 2003). 
xii
 A Tobit model similar to this OLS, including distance to market, was estimated too. As 
expected, the results between OLS and Tobit are identical.  
xiii
 
xiii
 T-tests were run to check differences before and after the matches. The null hypothesis 
that the mean values of the two groups do not differ after matching cannot be rejected for any 
variable. Moreover we checked for “bad matches” as follows. We impose the condition to 
discard those treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or 
less than the minimum propensity score of the controls. This yields leaving out 3 
observations. However, the results do not change substantially from the one reported in the 
text. Propensity score matching has been estimated using the Stata command –psmatch2-. 
Notice that we have always found a statistically significant difference between treatment and 
control group using different matching techniques, including matching on covariates instead 
of propensity scores using  the –nnmatch- command (Abadie et al. 2004).   
 
